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To policymakers, the major attraction of work and training programs for welfare recipients is
that they hold out the prospect that recipients can be moved off the rolls and into self-sufficiency in
the private labor market, thereby decreasing welfare costs and caseloads. This paper considers the
possibility that such programs may also affect the attractiveness of welfare in the first place, either by
making welfare less desirable because the work-training program is viewed as a burden, or by making
it more desirable because the program is viewed favorably by potential applicants. Such responses are
termed "entry-rate effects." Some empirical estimates of these effects are presented which suggest that
entry-rate responses, whether positive or negative, may affect the caseload more than the direct effect
of the programs in moving recipients off the rolls.The Effect of Work and Training Programs on Entry
and Exit from the Welfare Caseload
Work and training programs for welfare recipients are now a firmly established component of
the Aid to Families with Dependent Children (AFDC) program and other welfare programs in the
United States. After modest beginnings in the 1970s (see Bassi and Ashenfelter [1986] for a review of
that period), such programs began to be introduced more seriously in the early 1980s with the passage
of the 1981 Omnibus Budget and Reconciliation Act, which encouraged states to experiment with
different types of programs. This activity culminated with the 1988 Family Support Act, which
required that all states establish a JOBS program to provide work, training, job search, or education
programs to certain groups of AFDC recipients.
The major focus of policy research on work and training programs has been on their effects on
the earnings and employability of AFDC recipients, and on whether those who go through the
programs move off the rolls. There have been many studies of this kind as well as a number of
reviews of the findings (Burtless, 1989; Greenberg and Wiseman, 1992; Gueron and Pauly, 1991;
Moffitt, 1992b). Although there is a wide range of findings, partly because the programs examined
are themselves extremely diverse in character, the consensus of these surveys is that work and training
programs do often increase earnings and employability and decrease welfare caseloads and benefit
payments. The earnings "payoffs" are often in the range of $200 to $500 per year after three years,
and the reductions in the welfare caseload are as high as 7 percentage points after three years (Gueron
and Pauly, 1991, pp. 15, 142). Although these effects may seem modest, they are nevertheless
significant for policy purposes, especially in light of the view held in the 1970s that such programs
had little impact at all.
This paper is an examination of whether work and training programs may have an additional
impact on the welfare caseload operating through what are here termed "entry" effects. These effects
would arise if the introduction of a work-training program were to change the attractiveness of welfare2
from the point of view of potential applicants. The program could affect application rates positively or
negatively. On the one hand, if the work-training program is viewed as a burden and an imposition,
and therefore in an unfavorable light, some potential applicants would presumably choose not to apply
even though they would have in the absence of the program. On the other hand, if the program is
viewed in a favorable light because of its potential to increase earnings and employability, this would
tilt some potential applicants in the direction of applying for welfare when they might not have
otherwise.
The possibility that these effects might occur, and whether they might be empirically important
enough for policymakers to worry about, has not been considered in the policy research literature in
this area.
1 This paper is intended to provide a first discussion of the issue and to furnish illustrative
empirical estimates of the potential magnitude of entry effects.
The first, and main, body of the paper provides a discussion of the potential for entry-rate
effects. The theoretical effects that should be expected from a strict economic choice analysis are
outlined, and how that analysis should be modified in light of the real-world realities of work and
training programs is then discussed. The second section provides illustrative estimates of the potential
empirical importance of entry-rate effects. The final section discusses the policy implications of the
findings.
I. THE POTENTIAL FOR ENTRY-RATE EFFECTS
For present purposes, a "welfare-work" program need only be defined very generally as a
program that requires welfare recipients to engage in some activity that is associated with work,
training, education, or job search. At the start of the discussion, only mandatory programs will be
considered; later, the modifications in the conclusions for the case of voluntary programs will be
discussed. A welfare-work program will be presumed to have at least some positive effect on the3
future earnings and employability of recipients who go through the program, although the magnitude
of the earnings payoff will be a major determinant of its caseload effects.
The key characteristic of all welfare-work programs is that they require the recipient to spend
time in the activity. That requirement therefore fundamentally alters the nature of the experience of
being on welfare.
Given this, it should be mentioned immediately that one motivation for welfare-work programs
is to prevent recipients from engaging in other activities that produce unreported income. At least in
the beginning of the discussion below, that possibility will be ignored, for I will consider only the
caseload responses that would occur if all recipients reported income accurately.
The best framework for thinking about entry and exit effects of welfare-work programs is the
standard economic theory of choice. According to that theory, individuals weigh the relative benefits
and costs of applying for or leaving the welfare rolls in making their decisions. The conventional,
"static" theory suggests that potential applicants as well as recipients continually compare two
variables in making decisions to apply or to exit: potential earnings in the private labor market, and
the welfare benefit.
2 Empirical research has strongly confirmed this theory, for welfare benefits and
potential earnings have been shown repeatedly to have strong positive and negative effects,
respectively, on the probability of being on AFDC at a point in time and on the probability of entering
the rolls; and the probability of exiting the rolls has been shown to be negatively affected by benefits
and positively affected by potential earnings (see Moffitt [1992b] for a review of the literature).
It is worth noting that these research findings are based upon data drawn from periods when
very few welfare recipients worked at all. Consequently, the benefit and potential earnings effects that
have been estimated should be interpreted as reflecting a choice by eligibles between two polar
alternatives, one that involved work and being off the welfare rolls, and one that almost always
corresponded to not working and being on the rolls.4
After the introduction of a welfare-work program, this situation obviously changes. For those
recipients who are required to participate in the program, welfare recipiency would now require work,
although perhaps not as much as they would choose, or be able to obtain, off welfare. The
implications of economic choice theory for the welfare participation and caseload response to this
introduction are presented mathematically in the appendix, but can be discussed without using
equations.
A key question is whether eligible individuals, both those on and off the rolls, are completely
myopic or whether they are at least partly forward-looking. If they are completely myopic and
therefore compare only the current gains and losses of being on welfare, exits from welfare would
almost certainly increase and entry onto welfare would almost certainly fall. Exits would increase for
two reasons. First, many recipients initially on the rolls would change their minds about being on
welfare if a significant amount of work were required, and would opt instead to try to "make it" off
the rolls. It is also a reasonable prediction that those who would leave would be those recipients with
relatively greater job skills and opportunities in the private labor market. Second, those who choose to
continue to receive welfare despite the activity requirement would, on average, later find themselves in
the lucky (i.e., unanticipated) position of having increased potential earnings off the rolls. Some
fraction would therefore leave the rolls at that later point.
Whether both of these caseload reductions are desirable depends upon the objectives of the
program. If the goal of the program is not merely to reduce the caseload but to increase skills, then
the welfare exits arising from the first source are undesirable because those recipients who leave do
not receive any skill upgrades. On the other hand, if the goal of the program is to drive cheaters off
the rolls, or merely to impose a participation requirement for its own sake (e.g., to impose a "social
obligation," to use Mead’s term [1986]), both sources of increased exits would be welcomed, even if
most were to arise from the first source.5
In addition to an increase in exit rates there would be a decrease in application rates and hence
in entry rates. Just as some recipients would choose to exit prior to receiving program services, some
nonrecipients who would have applied for welfare in the absence of the welfare-work program would
now choose not to do so, given the mandated activity requirement.
But suppose that welfare recipients and potential applicants are not completely myopic, but are
at least partly forward-looking. In that case, the responses could be quite different because the
presumed positive average effect of the work program on future earnings and employability might be
recognized in advance. Consequently, the "initial" exits would not rise as much, if they were to rise at
all, and entry would either not fall as much as otherwise, or might even rise. Individuals would make
benefit-cost calculations for the relative current costs of participation in the welfare-work program and
the relative future gains in terms of higher earnings and employability, at least implicitly. The
outcome of those implicit calculations, and therefore the net effect of the welfare-work program on the
welfare caseload, would depend on three key factors: (i) the degree of forward-looking behavior--that
is, the individual’s discount rate; (ii) the magnitude of the earnings payoff to the program
3; and (iii)
the time and hassle requirements of the program. If individual discount rates are low, earnings payoffs
are high, and time requirements are low, the welfare-work program could actually increase the size of
the welfare caseload.
Is the possibility that the caseload might rise as a result of the introduction of a work-training
program plausible? Is it plausible that members of the eligible population would ever quit their jobs
to go on welfare to take advantage of a training program? Job-quitting does not seem plausible, but
positive entry effects could occur anyway. In practice, entry onto welfare would no doubt take place
the way it does now: after a woman loses a job or becomes unemployed for some other reason, or
after she gives birth to an out-of-wedlock child or her marriage breaks up, she must decide whether to
apply for welfare or to search for a new job and attempt thereby to establish herself off welfare.6
There is no reason, on a priori grounds, to expect that individuals in such a situation would not take
the presence of a work-training program on welfare into account in making that decision, and no
reason not to expect that women who are on the borderline between applying and not applying for
welfare might alter their decisions in the presence of a welfare-work program.
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Further consideration of how things might work in practice suggests as well that the distinction
between entry-rate effects and exit-rate effects of a welfare-work program might become blurred. For
example, women might go on the rolls and then, if they decided the work program were too onerous
or if the future value of the program seemed to be too low, exit the rolls either prior to participation in
the work program or shortly after entering it. This is particularly likely to occur if there is a waiting
list for the work program, for in that circumstance a woman may choose to go on the rolls and wait
until program participation is required before exiting. All these responses would appear as welfare
"exits," although they would be the result of individual judgments involving the same considerations as
those involved in entry decisions. In both cases, a decision is made not to be on welfare prior to
completing the work-training program, although in one case the recipient is already on welfare when
making that decision.
5
To this bare-bones economic reasoning must be added numerous qualifications and
complicating factors, among which are the following: the importance of uncertainty; the difference in
short-run and long-run effects; the mandatoriness of the program and the program participation
requirements; and the effect of private-sector training opportunities.
Uncertainty and the Short Run vs. the Long Run
It is quite likely, if not almost certainly, to be the case that welfare trainees and potential
applicants will have little or no idea of the earnings payoff to a particular training program when it is
initially introduced. Uncertainty is also likely to be present for programs that continually undergo
significant changes in their character. It could be argued that existing work-training programs such as7
JOBS and the WIN demonstrations of the 1980s were in this category: the JOBS program has not
been yet implemented on a large scale and knowledge of its effects is not widespread, and the WIN
demonstrations were rarely in place on a sufficiently large scale or for a long enough period to
substantially affect entry decisions.
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Unfortunately, the presence of significant uncertainty will make the negative entry effects of
work-training programs count more heavily. Potential applicants and recipients who are unsure of the
payoff to a work-training program will see only its burden--because the burden is not uncertain at all--
and hence will be less likely to apply for welfare and more likely to exit before receiving training. In
either case, training is not received by such individuals, which is often the goal of the policy, as
mentioned above.
However, if a program is in place and stable in design for a significant period of time, its
effects are likely to become known to the eligible population. Positive entry effects are therefore more
likely to occur in the long run, although how long this would be is difficult to predict.
Participation Requirements and Mandatory Nature
The caseload effects of a welfare-work program are certain to depend upon the scale of the
program relative to the size of the potential (i.e., nonexempt) caseload. If only a small portion of the
nonexempt caseload receives program services, entry effects will necessarily be small. Of course, exit
effects, even those arising from increased job skills, will also be small in that case because few
recipients participate in the program. Low participation rates have thus far been the rule rather than
the exception in welfare-work programs, and for this reason alone large caseload effects are unlikely to
have occurred. However, they may in the future if JOBS or some other welfare-work program is
extended in scale.
The effects on the caseload of a voluntary, rather than a mandatory, welfare-work program
bears a relationship to the issue of scale and waiting lists. A voluntary program could never have8
negative entry effects or positive exit effects prior to program participation, and therefore the caseload
effects of a voluntary program are more likely to be positive than are the caseload effects of a
mandatory program. The only situation in which the two programs would have the same effects
would be one in which all women viewed the program favorably. In that case, all women would
prefer to participate in the program even if it were mandatory. In practice, welfare caseloads are
sufficiently heterogeneous that a welfare-work program is almost certain to be viewed unfavorably by
some portion of the eligible population. For example, as noted previously, women with relatively high
potential private-market earnings are likely to be those deterred from entry and encouraged to exit
early.
The relative effects of mandatory and voluntary programs are "often cloudy" (Gueron and
Pauly, 1991, p. 12), especially if the scale of the program is not extensive. For example, if the supply
of available program slots is limited, program operators will naturally tend to give priority to
volunteers. Such a program could therefore become indistinguishable from a voluntary program even
if it was titularly mandatory.
It is worth stressing that limited scale has been the rule rather than the exception in the history
of welfare-work programs to date. Consequently, a welfare system with a mandatory work program
with sufficient slots for a 100-percent participation rate of the nonexempt caseload would be quite
different than the current system. Welfare would become essentially indistinguishable from a job, the
closeness depending upon the number of hours of work required by the work program and how that
compares to the expected number of work hours off welfare. Recipients would show up each day for
their "job" and they would receive a "wage" (i.e., the welfare benefit) each month. If they did not like
the job, they could "quit" (i.e., leave welfare). If the "job" were a "good" one, it would increase skills
and have a payoff in terms of higher future earnings. In such a world, welfare entry and exit decisions9
would be made on the same basis as job entry and job exit decisions are currently made by those off
welfare.
Although this scenario is fanciful in many ways, the Family Support Act envisioned something
similar because it aimed to change the culture and character of the AFDC experience. AFDC was to
be transformed into a program in which work, training, and education were to be an integral and
inseparable part of welfare recipiency. Being on welfare was to be intrinsically linked to preparation
for self-sufficiency off the rolls. Current policy developments are taking this philosophy further in the
same direction.
Private-Sector Training Opportunities
Another factor that should be important in the entry and exit decisions of many women is the
nature and availability of work and training opportunities off welfare. The presence of a fully funded
and universally eligible JTPA program, for example, offering work programs with the same or greater
payoff than those offered by the AFDC program, would reduce or eliminate any possible positive entry
effects of a welfare-work program since AFDC would offer nothing that is not available off AFDC.
The possible positive entry effects that were discussed above largely arise from the assumption that the
welfare-work program might offer an opportunity to current and potential recipients which they could
not obtain in any other way than being on AFDC. The general presumption that private employers are
not willing to invest in training of low-skilled women implies that it could be only another
government-funded program, like JTPA, that could offer something comparable to what is offered by
AFDC.
However, it should be noted that even if JTPA and AFDC work programs were equally
available and identical in character (i.e., had the exact same requirements and future payoffs), there
would be some incentive to enroll in the AFDC program rather than the JTPA program since the
former would pay a substantial benefit while the latter would not.10
II. ILLUSTRATIVE EMPIRICAL ESTIMATES
Ideally, empirical estimates of entry-rate effects could be obtained either through direct
experimentation or through econometric and statistical evaluation analysis. Unfortunately, neither
method is possible at the present time and may not be possible for many years. The major reason is
that, despite the popularity of work and training programs, no state has yet implemented them on a
sufficiently large scale and for a long enough period of time to observe the types of effects that might
occur. The work and training programs of the 1970s and early 1980s were either demonstration
programs for only a small portion of the caseload, or were underfunded and hence never enrolled more
than a small fraction of the caseload (such was the case for the AFDC WIN program, for example).
Consequently, any statistical analysis of caseload trends before and after those programs were
introduced would be unlikely to show an impact.
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The most promising direct estimation of entry-rate effects could be made possible by the JOBS
program required by the 1988 Family Support Act, since the Act requires nationwide implementation
of the program and requires that it be mandated for a significant fraction of the caseload.
Unfortunately, an analysis of the impact of JOBS on entry is still many years away.
8 In addition,
since (at current writing) the JOBS program is still underfunded five years after enactment, it has not
yet affected a majority of the caseload, even the nonexempt portion. Hence it is not yet clear whether
the JOBS program will ever provide a test of the entry effects of a large-scale work and training
program.
In the absence of direct evidence, estimates of entry effects can be obtained only by
extrapolation from current data, employing assumptions regarding how a welfare-work program would
be viewed by potential applicants. To make such estimates, the basic assumption made in the analysis
reported below is that, as a first approximation, a fully implemented work and training program for11
AFDC recipients would convert the AFDC program into the equivalent of a job. The "job" of being
on AFDC would pay a "wage" equal to the benefit divided by the number of hours of "work"
(meaning activity required by the work-training program). In return for this "job," there would also be
a earnings "payoff"--the wage would be higher in the future than it would be if this "job" were not
taken. Would a potential recipient take this "job" or would she take a conventional job in the private
sector? The recipient would trade off the two current "wages"--namely, the AFDC benefit vs. private-
sector potential wages--and would trade off the two future "wages"--how much wages would be in the
future if on the AFDC "job" today vs. in the private sector today.
This approach is implemented in two steps.
Step 1. Estimate the determinants of current AFDC participation and how future wages affect
it. Using an appropriate longitudinal data set on welfare-eligible female heads, the effects on AFDC
participation of the benefit level, the individual wage level, and the growth rate of wages can be
estimated. In algebraic form, we may write the AFDC participation regression equation as
Prob. of being on AFDC = f(Current Wage, Current Benefits, (1)
Future Wage Growth)
Here the wage-growth variable is an estimate of the growth rate of wages in the future, beyond the
current period at which AFDC participation is observed. Since very few women on welfare work, at
least as AFDC is currently constituted, this wage growth is beneficial only if the woman is not on
AFDC and is in the private labor market, gaining work experience. The coefficient on the
future-wage-growth variable can therefore be used as an indication of whether welfare-eligible women
exhibit forward-looking behavior. If that coefficient is not zero--it should be expected to be negative,
more specifically--then this indicates that eligibles take into account future wages in making current12
welfare participation decisions, even if the current wage is held constant. On the other hand, if the
coefficient is zero or insignificant, this is a prima facie indication of myopic behavior.
Step 2. Extrapolate these estimates to an environment that offers a "welfare job." Using the
estimates obtained in Step 1, both the caseload-increasing and caseload-decreasing effects of a welfare-
work program can be simulated. The caseload-increasing effects arise from the presumed positive
earnings payoff of the welfare-work program. Since the estimates in Step 1 give the effect of future
wage growth on current welfare participation, the effect of a welfare-work program can be simulated
by assuming that being on AFDC generates wage growth as well. Specifically, since potential wages
do not grow if a woman is on AFDC and not in a work-training program, the future-wage-growth
variable in equation (1) represents the difference between wage growth off welfare and wage growth
on welfare (which is zero). A welfare-work program should narrow that difference, or even reverse its
sign if it has a sufficiently large payoff. Consequently, an increase in the welfare participation rate
will be predicted if any positive earnings payoff from the welfare-work program is assumed, and the
corresponding earnings payoff difference is substituted into the welfare participation equation above.
On the other hand, the welfare-work program also implies that welfare becomes like a "job."
The estimates in Step 1, like all estimates of the effects of benefits and wages on welfare participation,
show that wages must exceed benefits by some amount to induce a woman to work--the costs of
transportation, clothing, and child care, as well as the loss of time spent at home, require this. The
"wedge" between wages and benefits is, as a first approximation, an indicator of the implicit valuation
that women put on work vs. nonwork. Therefore, a caseload-reducing effect of a welfare-work
program can be simulated by assuming that the welfare benefit is, effectively, reduced by the amount
of this wedge once a work program on the rolls becomes mandatory. If the welfare-work program is
assumed not to require as many hours of work as work in the private market (more on this below),
only a fraction of this wedge need be reduced.13
There is also the caseload-reducing effect that arises later for women who have gone through
the program. Given an assumed earnings payoff, potential earnings are higher and therefore the
estimates obtained in Step 1 can be used to directly predict the fraction of women who will move off
welfare at that time.
This nontechnical summary is demonstrated in technical form in the appendix. To estimate the
initial participation equation, a set of female heads from the Michigan Panel Study of Income
Dynamics was constructed with information on AFDC participation, wages, benefits, and wage growth
over time. The estimates of equation (1) show that greater wage growth in the future has a negative
effect on current welfare participation, consistent with expectations. An equation estimated on 2800
women with less than a high school degree is used for the simulations. Predicted probabilities of
being on welfare in the absence and in the presence of a welfare-work program are calculated for each
woman and are then averaged.
Although equation (1) is a "static" welfare participation equation--that is, it is not an equation
for transitions onto and off of the rolls--it can be used to simulate effects that will be termed "entry"
and "exit" effects below. The equation can first be used to simulate, for each woman, the probability
of being on welfare in the absence of a welfare-work program, and can then be used to simulate that
probability in its presence. "Entry" probabilities are then based upon the number of women who are
simulated either to be off welfare in the absence of the work program but to be on welfare after its
introduction (positive entry effects), or to be on welfare in the absence of the program but to be off
welfare in its presence (negative entry effects). "Exit" probabilities are based upon the number of
women simulated to be on welfare but whose earnings and wages are increased enough to induce
them to go off the rolls afterwards. The appendix gives the exact formulas for calculating the two
entry effects and the exit effect.
9,1014
The simulations require as an input an estimate of the effect of a welfare-work program on
future earnings. Gueron and Pauly (1991, p. 15) summarize the results of twelve major evaluations of
welfare-work programs and find the estimated effects on earnings to range from 1 percent to 43
percent within one to three years of receipt. This is a wide range of estimates but it can be narrowed
considerably. As discussed by Gueron and Pauly, the large estimates are concentrated among
"selective-voluntary," intensive programs like Supported Work and the AFDC Homemaker Health Care
Aid Demonstration. "Broad coverage" programs such as the WIN demonstrations and most job search
assistance programs have much lower earnings effects. The JOBS program enacted by the Family
Support Act lies somewhere in between these two types of programs, but will be much closer to the
latter than to the former. In addition, most programs show, or can be expected to have, a decay rate
of some magnitude. The simulations performed here are designed to capture only the long-run,
permanent earnings impact of a welfare-work program, which can be thought of as an average of a
changing earnings impact over ten or more years. The earnings impact over this length of time is
likely to be considerably smaller than those shown within the first three years of a program.
The baseline earnings gain simulated in the first results presented below is taken to be 5
percent, which is in the middle of the lower set of earnings impacts given by Gueron and Pauly. A
permanent increase in earnings of 5 percent is a sizable amount and could only be achieved by a rather
successful and high-payoff program. Therefore, simulations are also conducted for a program with a
modest 1 percent earnings impact. In addition, however, given the possibility that earnings impacts
might be even greater than 5 percent--in light of the Gueron-Pauly summary--programs with earnings
impacts of 10 percent and 20 percent are also calculated.
Another issue in estimating the earnings impact of a welfare-work program concerns whether
the impact is spread uniformly through the nonexempt caseload and, in particular, whether the impacts
are stronger for the more disadvantaged or the less disadvantaged recipients. According to Gueron and15
Pauly (1991, pp. 10, 30), previous research shows that programs have the greatest impacts on women
in the "middle" range of the caseload, and that the effect of training on earnings is considerably
weaker both for those who are the most skilled as well as for those who are the most disadvantaged.
Gueron and Pauly speculate that those in the former group are likely to perform better than average in
the labor market in any case, and that those in the latter group are sufficiently difficult to train that the
rather modest efforts attempted thus far have not been able to have much effect. In any case,
whatever the cause, the Gueron-Pauly conclusion is adopted for the simulations here, and the earnings
impacts mentioned in the last paragraph are taken to be those for women in the middle portion of the
potential earnings distribution. The earnings impact for the best-off and worst-off individuals are
assumed to be only one-half of the impact for those in the middle portion (see the appendix for
details).
All of the simulations presented here are for a welfare-work program that is fully funded,
which means that participation is required of all recipients if mandatory, and slots are available for all
who want them if voluntary. These assumptions are at variance with actual programs for two reasons.
First, in actuality there are large categories of recipients who are not required to participate.
Therefore, the estimates to be given below should be interpreted as effects only on the nonexempt
caseload, which may be only a modest percentage of the total caseload. Second, it is perhaps the rule
rather than the exception that welfare-work programs are underfunded and that there are insufficient
slots for all nonexempt cases (this is certainly the case for JOBS at the current time). This also
implies that the estimates simulated here are overestimates and should be reduced, roughly, by the
percentage of the nonexempt caseload for whom slots are not available.
Finally, an important issue concerns the requirements in the welfare-work program for the
number of hours to be spent in the activity. Under the JOBS CWEP component, for example, the
maximum hours requirement is determined by dividing the benefit by the minimum wage, a rule that16
results in different hours requirements for different women in different states (for example, it results in
relatively low hours requirements in low-benefit states). The JOBS program also has a twenty-hour
rule (per week) for participation in the program to count for purposes of the Act. Whatever the rule,
however, it is likely to be the case that a welfare-work program would not require as much time spent
in program activity as would be necessitated by work in the private labor market off AFDC.
Consequently, simulations are presented below for different hours requirements in the welfare-work
program relative to hours of work off AFDC.
Results
Table 1 gives the estimates of the baseline welfare-work program with a 5 percent earnings
impact in the middle portion of the earnings distribution for different hours requirements in the
program. The first column presents estimates based on the assumption that the hours requirements in
the welfare-work program would be only one-half those in the private labor market (e.g., 20 instead of
40, or 15 instead of 30). As shown in the first row, 3.1 percent of all initial recipients are estimated to
exit AFDC because of increased potential earnings from the program. Although this percentage may
seem modest, it is slightly larger than the caseload reductions summarized by Gueron and Pauly (1991,
p. 142), who report that most evaluations have estimated caseload reductions through exiting trainees
of from 1.5 percent to 2 percent.
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The simulations also show entry to be affected both negatively and positively by the
introduction of the program. Almost 25 percent of welfare-eligible nonrecipients who would not have
been on AFDC in the absence of the work program would go on AFDC after it is introduced. In part
this is a reflection of the fact that so little training takes place in the private labor market for17
TABLE 1
Baseline Estimates of the Long-Run Effect of a Mandatory Welfare-Work Program
on the AFDC Caseload
Relative Hours Requirement
.50 .75 1.00
Pre-program AFDC participation rate 54.2 54.2 54.2
Exit Effects
Exiting recipients as a
percentage of all initial
recipients
a 3.1 2.4 1.8
Entry Effects
Nonrecipient eligibles who
choose to enter (as a percentage
of initial nonrecipients)
b 24.7 17.5 14.8
Nonrecipient eligibles who
choose not to enter (as a
percentage of initial recipients)
c 5.7 12.2 18.8
Post-program AFDC participation rate 55.9 51.0 46.9
Net Effect on AFDC Caseload +3 -6 -13
(percentage change)
Notes: Estimates are for female heads with fewer than 12 years of schooling and with children
younger than 18. The welfare-work program is assumed to increase earnings by 5 percent for the
middle 50 percent of the AFDC-recipient earnings distribution and by 2.5 percent for all others. Exact
parameter values for the simulation are given in the appendix.
aFor example, if the relative hours requirement is .50, 1.7 percent of all female heads are predicted to
be on AFDC and hence go through the work program, and to have their potential earnings increased
enough to later leave the program. As a percentage of the population initially on AFDC, 3.1=1.7/.542.
bFor example, if the relative hours requirement is .50, 11.3 percent of all female heads are initially off
AFDC but are predicted to be on AFDC after the work program is introduced. As a percentage of the
population initially off AFDC, 24.7=11.3/.458.
cFor example, if the relative hours requirement is .50, 3.1 percent of all female heads are initially on
AFDC but are predicted to be off AFDC after the work program is introduced. As a percentage of the
population initially on AFDC, 5.7=3.1/.542.18
welfare-eligible women who work--earnings from private-sector work rise by very little, only 1 percent
according to the PSID data (this is the mean wage growth for female heads with fewer than 12 years
of education). Thus a welfare-work program with a 5 percent earnings impact represents a superior
alternative to what they could have otherwise. However, the estimates are also driven by the relation
of the benefit level to potential earnings. For the sample of unskilled women whose responses are
being simulated, benefits are often higher than potential earnings. The figure in the table reflects the
fact that many women who prefer not to be on AFDC despite this differential would be willing to
make a different decision if an attractive training opportunity were present. These women typically
have low to moderate wages but higher welfare benefits.
The table also shows that only 5.7 percent of women who are on AFDC in the absence of the
program (termed "initial recipients" in the table) would not be on AFDC (i.e., "would choose not to
enter" as termed in the table) if a mandatory work program were required as a condition of AFDC
receipt. For these women, the earnings gain from the program is outweighed by the burden of
participation in it. Once again, it is the relationship between benefit levels and potential earnings that
guides this behavior. Women in this category are likely to have relatively high wages and relatively
low benefits, compared to nonrecipients who enter the AFDC rolls. They are likely to be women who
are initially on the margin of whether to participate in AFDC, and instead of spending time in a job-
like activity while on AFDC, they would rather spend that same time in a labor market job which
reaps earnings not too far below, if not above, the AFDC benefit.
The net effect of all three changes on the AFDC caseload is a net increase of 3 percent. The
positive entry effect of the program outweighs the negative entry effect and the negative exit effect.
However, this finding is sensitive to the amount of time required in the activity, as shown by the other
columns in the table. A work program requiring three-quarters as much work as the typical private-
sector job for which these women would be qualified induces only a 17.5 percent positive entry effect
but a much larger 12.2 percent negative entry effect from women choosing not to go on AFDC (or to19
go off prior to enrollment in the work program). Exit effects fall to 2.4 percent because fewer women
go through the work program. The net effect on the caseload is now negative, implying a 6 percent
decline. An even greater decline, of 13 percent, is predicted if the welfare-work program requires the
same number of hours of activity as would be worked off AFDC.
Although whether the caseload would increase or decrease is sensitive to the hours
requirement, the results show that net caseload effects, whether positive or negative, are always
dominated by the entry effects; the effects arising from exit are quite small in absolute magnitude
relative to those relating to entry. Thus these simulations provide some suggestive evidence (although
no more than that) that entry effects may be quantitatively important. It should also be kept in mind,
in line with prior discussion, that these simulated entry effects are long-run effects--that is, those that
would occur only after a work program has been in place for several years and its impact had become
sufficiently well-known in the AFDC-eligible population to have an impact on entry decisions. The
net changes in the caseload shown in the table, whether positive or negative, would, therefore,
certainly occur only gradually over time. Consequently, these net changes should be interpreted only
as indicating the direction in which the caseload would tend to move.
Table 2 shows the effect of mandatory programs with different earnings payoffs. A 75-percent
relative hours requirement is assumed. Simulated entry and exit effects are shown for payoffs of 1
percent, 10 percent, 20 percent, and for a uniform payoff of 5 percent. The predictions show, as
should be expected, that higher payoffs increase the exit rate, increase the positive entry rate, and
reduce the negative entry rate. However, the main finding from the table is that the net effect on the
caseload is essentially unchanged by the magnitude of the earnings payoff. The increase in exits from
higher earnings is offset, in approximately equal magnitude, by the increase in the entry rate.20
TABLE 2
Effects of a Mandatory Welfare-Work Program on the AFDC Caseload




One Ten Twenty Five
Percent Percent Percent Percent
Exit Effects
Exiting recipients as a
percentage of all initial
recipients 0 5.9 16.2 3.3
Entry Effects
Nonrecipient eligibles who
choose to enter (as a
percentage of initial
nonrecipients) 15.3 21.2 29.3 19.0
Nonrecipient eligibles who
choose not to enter (as a
percentage of initial
recipients) 12.5 11.3 9.0 11.8
Net Effect on AFDC Caseload
(percentage change) -6 -6 -5 -6
Note: Hours requirement of .75.
aThe one, ten, and twenty percent payoffs are applied only to the middle 50 percent of the
AFDC-recipient earnings distribution; payoffs in the remainder are assumed to be one-half of these
amounts. The uniform program assumes a five percent payoff for all individuals.21
Table 3 shows the effect of the assumed magnitude of earnings-growth responsiveness (i.e.,
the discount rate) on caseload effects. The first column shows the effects that would occur if women
were completely myopic and did not take earnings-growth considerations into account at all in their
decisions. In this case, 2.4 percent of recipients would exit the rolls, as in the base case in Table 1,
but there would be no positive entry effects since eligibles would not anticipate the positive
consequences of the work program. Negative entry rates would rise, however, since only the
immediate burden of the program would be seen. These are much larger (26.6 percent) than those in
the base case in Table 1 (12.2 percent), resulting in a net caseload effect of -22 percent, much larger
than in the base case (-6 percent). A greater degree of responsiveness to the future, but one still lower
than used for the baseline simulations in Table 1, would have the effects shown in the second column
of Table 3. Some positive entry effects would occur, and the negative entry effects would be smaller
than was the case for zero responsiveness. These effects arise because women would now respond
positively to the earnings payoff to the program. The net caseload effect would be -10 percent, still
greater than in the base case. On the other hand, if women were to have a greater level of
responsiveness to future wage growth than assumed in the base case, the third column of Table 3
indicates that the caseload would not fall at all. A greater positive entry effect and a smaller negative
entry effect than in the base case would result in positive and negative caseload effects that offset each
other almost exactly, leaving the caseload unchanged instead of dropping by 6 percent.
The final column in Table 3 shows the simulated effects of a voluntary work program on the
caseload. In this case, there would be no negative entry effects since no one would be required to
enroll in the work program. The exit rate would also be smaller because some fraction of the caseload
would choose not to enroll. The net effect on the caseload would change from the -6 percent shown
in Table 1 to +7 percent as shown in Table 3. Thus these simulations suggest that a22
TABLE 3
Effects of a Mandatory Work Program for Different Levels of Earnings-Growth
Responsiveness and of a Voluntary Work Program
Voluntary
Level of Responsiveness Work
Zero Low High Program
Exit Effects
Exiting recipients as a percentage
of all initial recipients 2.4 2.4 2.4 1.1
Entry Effects
Nonrecipient eligibles who
choose to enter (as a percentage
of initial nonrecipients) 0 16.8 20.9 17.5
Nonrecipient eligibles who
choose not to enter (as a
percentage of initial recipients) 26.6 14.9 7.2 0
Net Effect on AFDC Caseload
(percentage change) -22 -10 0 +7
Note: Hours requirement of .75.23
voluntary program might cause the caseload to rise in circumstances when it would fall under a
mandatory program. Unfortunately, as noted previously, the operational difference between mandatory
and voluntary programs is often small, for most programs have both mandatory and voluntary
elements. Sanctioning is applied only in certain circumstances, for example, and termination from
AFDC is less often applied than grant reduction. In addition, all welfare-work programs only require
intervals of participation in it, which, in most cases, are not imposed on the recipient for an indefinite
time period if she does not find a job.
In any case, the major implication of these illustrative simulations is that entry effects could
be, in the long run, more important than exit effects in determining the eventual trend of the caseload
once a welfare-work program has been set permanently in place. The net effects on the caseload
predicted here, whether positive or negative, and regardless of the type of program simulated or the
assumptions made regarding recipient responsiveness, take on their signs and magnitudes largely as a
result of the relative importance of the caseload-reducing entry effects and the caseload-increasing
entry effects. The exit effects that arise directly from the earnings payoff of the work program are of
distinctly second-order importance.
III. SUMMARY AND POLICY CONCLUSIONS
The analysis in this study suggests that the introduction of welfare work and training programs
could have potential long-run effects on the rate of entry onto the AFDC caseload. Mandatory work-
training programs that have relatively heavy time and participation requirements are likely to reduce
entry onto AFDC or increase the rate of exit from the rolls prior to completion of the program, leading
to a net decrease in the caseload arising from discouragement from AFDC recipiency--not from
increased potential earnings. Voluntary welfare-work programs are likely to increase the caseload, as
are programs which have earnings payoffs significantly in excess of those available from private-sector
work, for both make the AFDC program more attractive than it had been before. Empirical24
illustrations of the sizes of these caseload effects indicate that they could be quite large, although their
magnitudes would depend heavily on the time and participation requirements of the program and on
the degree of "forward-lookingness" of the welfare-eligible population. With regard to the latter, to
the extent that welfare-eligible women are completely myopic, the caseload is likely to fall because
many such women will see only the burden of the program and will choose to leave the rolls, or not
even apply, prior to completion of the work and training program.
Entry-rate effects are likely to occur only in the long run. The length of time it would take
for the caseload to change would depend on how quickly the earnings payoffs to a welfare-work
program are perceived by former recipients and first-time welfare eligibles, and this will, in turn,
depend upon the degree to which a stable training program of a particular type remains in place for a
sufficient period of time for its payoff to be known and therefore anticipated. To the degree that the
earnings payoff either never becomes known with much certainty to the welfare-eligible population, or
to the degree that training programs continue to evolve without stabilizing, it is probable that welfare-
eligible women will view the costs of the program as more important, because they are more obvious
and certain, than the rewards. This would make a decline in the caseload more likely.
The implication of these findings for the JOBS program is that the program can be expected to
exert downward pressure on the caseload from a decline in the entry rate of eligibles if, as intended by
the legislation, it is extended in the long run to a sufficiently high fraction of the nonexempt caseload
as to make the program essentially mandatory, and if the time requirements for the JOBS program are
moderately high. If the JOBS program succeeds in its goal of changing the "culture" of AFDC
recipiency from its present one to one in which work or some other obligation is an expected part of
being on the rolls, it will change the view of the program from the perspective of nonrecipient
eligibles as well as recipients. At the present time, however, the JOBS program still has relatively low
participation rates and is operated, as a consequence, largely as a voluntary program. As long as the25
program is operated in this fashion and stays at a small scale, and as long as it has not changed the
nature of AFDC recipiency, it is likely to have little effect on the caseload from either entry or exit.
Many of the entry effects found here would change in magnitude if training equivalent to that
provided to AFDC recipients were available to women who are not on AFDC. If, for example, JTPA
slots were available to women not on AFDC to the same extent as to women on AFDC, if JTPA were
to provide similar program services, and if JTPA were to provide the same child-care and medical
subsidies as are available to AFDC recipients, incentives to apply for AFDC or to stay on AFDC in
order to receive a welfare-work program would be greatly lessened. Alternatively, if more training
were provided to unskilled women by low-wage employers, possibly from government subsidies, such
incentives would also be lessened. However, the relative income available on and off AFDC would
remain as a factor affecting the incentives of AFDC participation. Unless JTPA paid a stipend equal
to the AFDC benefit, for example, there would still be an incentive to receive training on AFDC
instead of under JTPA. On the other hand, if private-sector employers provided on-the-job training
equivalent to that on AFDC, but at an earnings level higher than the AFDC benefit, there would be an
incentive to leave the AFDC rolls and receive the training from the employers. Any universal,
noncategorical approach to the training of the disadvantaged population in the United States would
have to address these incentive issues.2627
Appendix:
The Mathematical Model, Estimation Method,
and Simulation Procedure
This appendix provides details of the mathematical model, estimation method, and simulation
procedure underlying the text discussion of expected theoretical effects and the text simulation
estimates. However, space constraints in this appendix do not permit a full accounting for all details;
these are provided in a longer background report (Moffitt, 1992c).
I. Mathematical Model
The theoretical discussion in the text is motivated by a mathematical model, upon which the
text simulations are partly based. This model is an idealized two-period life-cycle model in which an
individual chooses whether to work or to be on welfare in both periods. There is an earnings "payoff"
to both work and welfare, at least if the latter has a work program in place. The individual is assumed
to pick the utility-maximizing alternative.
The basic equations underlying the model are the following:
V(E1,E2) = U(Y1,E1)+ rU(Y2,E2) (1)
U(Yt,Et)=Y t - aEt (2)
Yt =P tB + (1-Pt)Wt (3)
W2 =W 1(1+g) if P1=0
(4)
W2 =W 1(1+d) if P1=128
Equation (1) is the lifetime utility function (V), which is a weighted sum of per-period utility (U) in
the two periods. The per-period utilities contain the value of disposable income (Yt) in period t (t=1
or 2) and a dummy variable for employment in period t (Et), equal to 1 if the person works and 0 if
not. The parameter r is the discount rate. Equation (2) gives the form of utility in each period: utility
is positively affected by income and negatively affected by work, with a denoting the marginal
disutility of work. Equation (3) gives the budget constraint, which relates a welfare participation
dummy, Pt--equal to 1 if on welfare and 0 if not--to disposable income. B is the welfare benefit and
Wt is the wage rate (both are assumed to be adjusted to apply to the same time frame, e.g., hourly or
weekly or monthly). Equation (4) gives the earnings payoffs of private-sector work and of a welfare-
work program, assuming such a program is in place and is mandatory (i.e., required if Pt=1): "g" is the
percentage increase in earnings in a private-sector job (per week, per month, or whatever the time
frame chosen is), and "d" is the earnings payoff from the welfare-work program.
Individual choice is first considered in the absence of a welfare-work program, then in its
presence. In its absence, we assume that d=0 and we also assume that Pt=1-Et, i.e., that work is not
required if on welfare but that work is a necessity if off welfare. In this case, the individual chooses
Et for t=1 and t=2; those choices determine welfare participation and disposable income in both
periods as well. In the background report (Moffitt, 1992c), it is shown that the individual will either
choose to work and be off welfare both periods, or to be on welfare both periods and not work.
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The choice between these two alternatives is determined by the following equations:
V(0,0) = B(1+r) (5)
V(1,1) = W1 - a + r[W1(1+g) - a] (6)29
*
Pt = V(0,0) - V(1,1)
(7)
= B-W 1 + a + r[ B-W 1(1+g) - a]
*
Pt =1i fP t ³ 0
* (8)
=0i fP t <0
Equations (5) and (6) give the utilities of the two choices, and equations (7) and (8) give their
difference and how they generate a choice for welfare participation, Pt. Multiplying (7) by 1/(1+r),
we obtain the welfare participation equation:
˜*
Pt = B-W 1 + a -[ r/(1+r)] W1g (9)
Thus, in the absence of a welfare-work program, welfare participation is more likely (i) the higher the
welfare benefit, (ii) the lower the wage, (iii) the higher the taste for leisure, (iv) the lower the rate of
time preference, and (v) the lower the rate of return to private-sector work.
As noted in the text, equation (9) shows the value of "leisure" to be a. That is the "wedge"
between the benefit and the wage that represents the dollar amount necessary to induce a woman to
work. Put differently, even if W1 were greater than B, a positive a might still induce a positive
participation propensity in (9) and hence discourage work.
In the presence of a mandatory welfare-work program, the individual has three choices: to stay
off welfare both periods (P1=P2=0 and E1=E2=1); to go on welfare the first period and leave the
second period after having received an increase in potential earnings (P1=1, P2=0, E1=1 since work is
required on welfare, and E2=1); or to go on welfare the first period and to stay on welfare the second
period despite the potential earnings increase (P1=P2=1, E1=1, E2=0). It is assumed that a welfare
recipient who has gone through a work program and still cannot find a job is not forced to stay in the
work program indefinitely, although she may be required to return in the future.
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As noted in the text, we also assume that the welfare-work program may not require as many
hours of work as would be necessitated by work in the private labor market. The letter "m" denotes
the ratio of welfare-work program hours to private labor market hours. If m<1, the reduction in utility
from working is hence ma rather than a.
The utilities of the three alternatives mentioned above are the following, where VP(E1,E2)i s
the utility of choosing E1 and E2 if the first-period welfare participation choice is P:
V0(1,1) = W1 - a + r[W1(1+g) - a] (10)
V1(1,1)=B- m a + r[W1(1+d) - a] (11)
V1(1,0)=B- m a + rB (12)
Comparing (11) to (12), we see that individuals who are on welfare in the first period will either go
off or stay on the second period depending on the sign of [W1(1+d)-B-a]. Comparing (10) to (11),
we see that individuals who plan to work both periods will decide on first-period welfare participation
by comparing the values of B and W1 in the first period (and comparing the difference to the "wedge"
ma) to the earnings payoffs "d" and "g" in the second period.
The choices of first-period welfare participation in the presence of a welfare-work program
and in its absence can bear almost any relationship to one another. That is, the sign of equation (9),
which determines participation choice in the absence of a welfare-work program, bears almost no
unambiguous relationship to which of the three utilities in (10)–(12) is maximal. Consequently, the
caseload can go either up or down after the introduction of the welfare-work program.
The case of a voluntary training program requires a relatively straightforward modification of
this analysis. In this case, the option V1(0,0) is once again an option, and it replaces the option
V1(1,0) in equation (12), which will usually not be chosen--the individual will not volunteer for a31
work program unless she plans to work the second period.
14 Relative to the situation with a
mandatory program, a small percentage of female heads will undertake training. In addition, none of
those who are recipients prior to the introduction of the training program will choose to leave the rolls;
consequently, the net effect of the training program on the caseload (i.e., the participation rate) is more
likely to be positive.
II. Estimation Method
Simulations of this model could be constructed by inserting values for all parameters taken
from the econometric literature. However, some estimation is performed here because there are no
estimates in the literature for r. In addition, because of this, the estimates in the literature for effects
of welfare benefits and wages on welfare participation and work may not be appropriate to use, since
they were obtained from regression specifications which excluded prospective variables (i.e., the
specifications were based upon static models). Therefore, the approach taken here is to perform a new
estimation.
The estimation is performed on a welfare-eligible sample of female heads of households from
the Michigan Panel Study of Income Dynamics (PSID) from 1968 to 1983. Assuming that the welfare
participation choices made in these data were made in an environment in which welfare-work
programs were insignificant, equation (9) above (the participation equation in the absence of a
welfare-work program) can be applied to the data. That equation can be estimated and an estimate of
r and the other parameters can thereby be obtained. The two equations used for the estimation are as
follows:
*
Pi = ai + gBi -W i - q(Wigi) (13)
* ˜ Pi = b1Bi + b2Wi + b3(Wigi)+X id + ei (14)32
Equation (13) is a modified version of (9), where a separate coefficient g is added to the
welfare benefit to allow its effects to differ from those of the wage rate, and where the parameter
q=1/(1+r) has been substituted for the coefficient on Wigi. Equation (14) is the same equation in
estimating form, with a vector of socioeconomic characteristics (Xi) added to proxy a and with the
coefficients relabeled. If this equation is estimated with probit, r can be identified. The coefficient on
Wigi is -q/s, where s is the standard deviation of the error term, which can be identified from the
coefficient on Wi, which is -1/s. The parameter g can also be identified because the coefficient on Bi
is -g/s.
The estimates of the discount rate are, therefore, obtained by regressing the welfare
participation rate on current benefits, current wages, and the growth rate of wages. If r=0 (i.e., if
individuals are completely myopic), then the growth rate of wages will have no effect on individual
welfare participation decisions, holding constant the current wage. On the other hand, if current
welfare participation decisions do respond to the growth rate of wages (again, holding the current
wage fixed), this is taken as evidence of forward-looking behavior.
The PSID extract used for the estimation contains all women who were ever over age 16 and
were ever female heads (i.e., with no spouse or partner present and with children under 18 in the
household) during the period 1968–1983. There are 1020 such women. All years in which she is a
female head are pooled together for the estimation of the probit equation (14), where the dependent
variable is set equal to 1 if the woman participated in AFDC in the previous year and 0 if not. The
real welfare benefit used is the guarantee amount for a family of four in the state of residence. The
wage level and wage-growth variables are obtained from the wage data of working women in the
sample. Because wages are missing for nonworking women and because the wage may be
endogenous, both wage levels and wage-growth variables are instrumented. The equation also includes
variables for age, age squared, race, region of residence, the state manufacturing wage, birth cohort,33
and college graduation. The means of the variables used, a detailed discussion of the instruments, and
the coefficient estimates from the probits may be found in the background report.
The coefficient estimates (not shown here for brevity) show significant positive effects of the
welfare benefit and significant negative effects of both wage levels and wage growth on welfare
participation probabilities. Thus the results confirm not only the existing research on static
participation determinants but are also consistent with forward-looking behavior on the part of welfare
recipients.
A variety of estimates were obtained on samples of individuals with different levels of
education and using different instruments. The preferred estimates, and those used for the simulation
model, are taken from the sample of women with less than a high school education. The estimates
imply that a one-percentage-point increase in the growth rate of real wages would lower the welfare
participation probability by one percentage point, at the mean of the data.
III. Simulation Procedure
Based on the estimates obtained in the econometric work, the base-case simulations use the
parameter values r=.90, g=.50, and s=.53. Sensitivity tests to the value of r are conducted assuming
it to equal 0, .50, and 2.00 instead. The parameter g, the assumed growth rate of private-sector wages,
is set equal to .01, its approximate mean in the PSID data.
As discussed in the text, the chosen values of "d" are guided by those in past program
evaluations as summarized by Gueron and Pauly (1991, p. 15). The base case assigns d=.05 to those
whose wages fall into the middle 50 percent of the distribution for those on AFDC (as computed from
the PSID data) and one-half this value to those with wages outside that range.
Using these parameter values, simulations are conducted in the absence and in the presence of
welfare-work programs. In the absence of a program, the participation probability, which is denoted
here as p, is the same in both periods and is based upon equation (13):34
(15)
where F is the normal cumulative distribution function and . In the presence of a mandatory
welfare-work program, participation choices are based upon equations (10)–(12), modified to allow a
coefficient of g on B. First differencing (11) and (12), we obtain
D =V 1(1,1) - V0(1,1)
(16)
= gB-W+a(1-m) + rW(d-g)
as the index describing whether the individual would prefer to be on welfare or not, if she is to work
both periods. Equation (16) shows that women with relatively low wages and relatively high benefits
would prefer to go on welfare and enroll in the welfare-work program rather than go off welfare to
work.
Substituting Xd for a, we may determine whether D is positive or negative. If D>0, the
participation probability is 1.0 in period 1 and in period 2 it is:
(17)
Here the issue is whether the earnings payoff, "d," is large enough to induce the woman to go off
welfare after having completed the welfare-work program. Women who have moderately high benefits
and moderately low wages may choose to stay on welfare, go through the work program, and then
stay on welfare afterwards as well.35
If D<0, the participation probability is the same in both periods and is equal to:
(18)
Here the issue is whether the loss in home-time that would be incurred if the woman went to work
(Xd) is so large that it outweighs the wage and wage growth from a private-sector job off welfare.
Women with relatively high benefits and relatively low wages may, again, choose to stay on welfare
and hence go through the work-training program, but not leave welfare afterwards.
The equilibrium participation rate is the average of the participation probabilities in the two
periods.
The entries in Tables 1–3 in the text are based on a division of the simulated values in the
population into different groups. Letting f be the fraction of the population simulated to have D>0, p1
be the simulated mean of (15) for those with D>0 (i.e., the participation rate of those with D>0 in the
absence of the program), and p0 be the simulated mean of (15) for those with D<0, the population
facing a mandatory program can be subdivided into six mutually exclusive groups, the fractions in
each given by:
I: f(1-p1) Fraction off welfare prior to program introduction, on welfare at t=1 and off
welfare at t=2 after introduction
II: f(p1-q) Fraction on welfare prior to program introduction, on welfare at t=1 and off
welfare at t=2 after introduction
III: fq + (1-f)r Fraction on welfare prior to program introduction, on welfare at t=1 and t=2
after introduction
IV: (1-f)(1-p0) Fraction off welfare prior to program introduction, off welfare at t=1 and t=2
after introduction
V: (1-f)(p0-r) Fraction on welfare prior to program introduction, off welfare at t=1 and t=2
after introduction36
The fraction of the population on welfare at t=1 after program introduction is the sum of groups I, II,
and III, and is equal to [f+(1-f)r]. The fraction of the population on welfare at t=2 is given by group
III. The equilibrium participation rate is the average of these two. The net effect of the training
program reported in the last row of Table 1 is the difference between this equilibrium participation rate
and p=fp1+(1-f)p0, the participation rate prior to program introduction, divided by the latter. The
three rows of Table 1 after the pre-program participation rate are, respectively, the probability in II
divided by p, the probability in I divided by 1-p, and the probability in V divided by p.
In the presence of a voluntary training program, the option V1(0,0) is added to the choice set.
The option V1(1,0) remains but is chosen only for those with a<0. The derivation of the probabilities
of participation in periods 1 and 2 follows the same logic as for a mandatory program and will not be
presented here for brevity.37
Endnotes
1An exception is my 1992 study (Moffitt, 1992a), but in that study I only considered the
implications of entry effects for evaluation methodology--in particular, for the question of whether
entry effects could be estimated more easily by nonexperimental methods or by randomized field
experiments.
2There are, of course, many other factors affecting entry and exits. However, they are ignored for
the purposes of the discussion.
3Some studies (e.g., Gueron and Pauly, 1991, pp. 37, 148) have found that many programs
increase employment rates but not wage rates. The difference is not important for present purposes,
for entry effects of the type discussed here would occur even if program payoffs were only in
employment. Note that, in this paper, "earnings" and "wages" are used interchangeably.
4The point of this example is that entry onto welfare generally takes place from unemployment,
not employment, and entry effects are more plausible in the former case. It might be noted that a
similar route is generally taken into nonwelfare training programs such as JTPA and, in the past,
CETA. It has been repeatedly documented that earnings take a "dip" just prior to entry into training,
reflecting some adverse employment event (see, e.g., Ashenfelter [1978]).
5Put differently, the true "entry rate" that would be affected is the entry into the welfare-work
program, not the entry onto welfare.
6An interesting question is whether welfare trainees and the individuals in low-income
communities learn the "true" effects of work-training programs before researchers do. If not, then
there is no question that the former could not know program effects since researchers still do not!
7One potential piece of direct evidence might come from those welfare-work experiments of the
1980s which randomized applicants rather than recipients, thereby giving applicants the opportunity to
decline to enter welfare if they did not like the work program that they were to be required to enter
(Gueron and Pauly, 1991, pp. 183–184). However, it is questionable whether individual responses in38
such a situation would be representative of those in the long run. In the experiments, applicants
presumably had little idea what the burdens or rewards of the program would actually be like. In the
long run, this would change.
8An evaluation is underway to conduct an impact analysis of JOBS, but it is not intended to
estimate the long-run entry effects of the program.
9As noted previously, the negative entry effect could be termed, alternatively, an exit effect if
women leave the rolls while on welfare but prior to being enrolled in the work program, as opposed to
never going on welfare in the first place. The simulations do not make a distinction between these
two ways in which the caseload-reducing effect could occur.
10Different women are predicted to make different choices because they have different benefits and
different wages, and because the estimation of equation (1) also includes sociodemographic variables
such as age, education, race, regional location, etc.
11Two of the studies showed reductions of 7 percent, however. The percentages reported by
Gueron and Pauly are "percentage point differences" in Table 4.2 of their book (1991).
12The background report also provides labor-leisure diagrams with graphical illustrations of the
budget constraint choices. Those diagrams are omitted here for brevity.
13There is another choice--be off welfare the first period and go on welfare the second period--but
this alternative will never be chosen. See the background report.
14An exception can occur if a<0, a case in which there is a "stigma" to not working while on
welfare. For this to occur, recipients would have to have a positive preference for being able to work
while on the rolls. In this case, it is possible that the sequence (1,0) would be preferred.39
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